

P AKISTAN:

A STRANGE AND VITAL BEDFELLOW

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INTRODUCTION

In times of direct peril, a state's leaders will make decisions based on perceived strategic need. The events of September 11, 2001 shook the confidence of the United States, a largely insulated superpower secure within the contours of its own soil. The fall of the World Trade Center devastated not only immediate victims but also leaders tasked with crafting a response. Contemporary alliances were struck to meet the emerging challenge as old alliances were pushed aside. The phenomenon of strategic alliance is hardly novel, because in the words of Thomas Christiansen, if politics make strange bedfellows then international politics often make the strangest.¹

While much has been made of American efforts to reshape the Middle East, less attention has been dedicated to similar endeavors in South Asia. Critical analysis is beginning to shift from Iraq outward to other essential states such as Pakistan, the primary focus of this paper. I will argue that an alliance with Pakistan is necessary to further American foreign policy objectives as strategic leverage gained in the region outweighs both incurred and potential costs.

Efforts will focus on determining the degree to which the American relationship with Pakistan furthers grand strategy in the post 9/11 environment. I will argue the merits of this approach while making three basic points. First, strategic alliances struck in the

¹ Thomas Christiansen. *Useful Adversaries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 6.

short-term can mature into beneficial long-term arrangements; as American relations with Egypt have demonstrated. Second, American grand strategy is often pursued through liberal rhetoric which masks realist intent; strategies past and present have attempted to champion liberal virtue in pleasant tones while the state pursues vital interests abroad. Third, the conditions which would facilitate cutting ties with Pakistan are unlikely to come to pass; domestic rancor of the public will incur little change as no tipping point, or sizeable alteration in opinion demanding government action, is in sight.²

This paper will be organized as follows: first, the importance of Pakistan to American grand strategy will be explained, which will then be followed by a brief discussion of relevant theories of statecraft and alliance formation. Next, discourse will center on American relations with Egypt to demonstrate the successful application of U.S. foreign policy in a predominately Muslim nation. Afterwards, contemporary relations with Pakistan will be analyzed according to perceived costs and benefits of alliance with predictions generated from lessons learned. Finally, challenges to the paper's central analysis will be presented and then critiqued.

I.0 ROLE OF U.S. GRAND STRATEGY

Grand strategy refers to the collection of military, political, and economic means to pursue a state's ultimate objectives.³ The construction of grand strategies often guides foreign policy and reflects how given

² The term 'tipping point' in this context is attributable to Daniel Yankelovich, "The Tipping Points," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2006).

³ Stephen D. Biddle. "America's Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment" *Strategic Studies Institute* (April 2005).

statesmen view the international system.⁴ In as much, the United States often takes international cues to establish a focal point for the allocation of its resources. During the midst of the Cold War, efforts were largely aimed at containing the spread of communism while avoiding major conflict with the Soviets. The collapse of the Soviet Union, although a triumph for capitalism and democracy, also stripped American statesmen of the magnetic north which had calibrated foreign policy.⁵

The intellectual debate over the allocation of American resources abruptly ended in September of 2001. An enemy flew through the New York skyline to supplant the threat once posed by communism. U.S. grand strategy in the post 9/11 landscape has been guided by “the restoration of security in a suddenly more dangerous world.”⁶ The new strategy has focused primarily on the terrorist threat enumerated in the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror (GWOT). National security discourse since 2001 has been less concerned with conquering states than with failed ones.⁷ New grand strategy emanates, “from the shock of surprise attack,”⁸ and “offers the most comprehensive statement to date of America’s globe-straddling post-Cold War ambitions.”⁹

⁴ Christopher Layne. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing” *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 1 (Summer 1997).

⁵ James Schlesinger. “Quest For a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 72 Issue 1 (1993/1994).

⁶ John Lewis Gaddis. “Grand Strategy in the Second Term” *Foreign Affairs* (January/ February 2005).

⁷ “National Security Strategy of the United States,” White House (September 2002).

⁸ “U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century”, U.S. Agency for International Development (January 2004).

⁹ Andrew J. Bacevich. “Bush’s Grand Strategy” *The American Conservative* (November 4, 2002).

1.1 EVALUATING GRAND STRATEGY

Stephen M. Walt posits that for a region to merit interest within American grand strategic concern, it must fulfill specific conditions. He asserts that U.S. foreign policy should be driven by: key interests; offense-defense dynamics; and causes of alignment.¹⁰ According to Walt, a region is of vital interest if it presents a threat critical to American security. The offense-defense qualification refers to the additional strain placed on the military in defense of potential allies. In states where offensive attack from enemies is more likely, U.S. military expenditures will increase to meet greater levels of threat. Causes of alignment are factors that determine the level of support the U.S. can expect from strategically important states. States are said to be vital if other actors are unable to fill the same role. If aligned states are unreliable, it is reasoned that the U.S. will be forced to take greater measure to preserve allegiance.¹¹

1.2 THE ROLE OF PAKISTAN

If Walt’s determinants are applied, Pakistan is certainly a state of vast strategic importance. South Asia is essential in the GWOT as the political climates of Sri Lanka, Burma and Bangladesh are ripe for unrest. Pakistani relations with neighboring India more than constitute an external threat with potential to alter the offense-defense balance. Nuclear states are of marked importance in grand strategic calculations, and neighboring nuclear states with a long history of animus and mutual distrust raise the stakes considerably. Pakistan plays a significant role in the U.S.-led GWOT primarily because it has little recourse. The success of the

¹⁰ Walt also identifies Soviet aims, which are not applicable to the topic.

¹¹ Stephen M. Walt. “The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy” *International Security* Vol. 14 No. 1 (Summer 1989).

Pakistani state is dependent upon continued U.S. economic assistance to check Indian might and keep the economy afloat.

1.3 STRATEGIES OF STATECRAFT

It should be noted that in the construction of grand strategy, statesmen often have incentive to mislead their own people. The practice is generally accepted by domestic constituencies with regards to foreign policy as decisions are seen in the promotion of the national interest.¹² Deception in domestic politics tends to be judged more harshly as it is a perceived link to corruption, which does not sit well with the general public. The habit takes two forms; concealment and spinning. The former holds when certain facts are withheld, the latter occurs when information is selectively provided and manipulated to serve a particular group's needs.

Statesmen often engage in strategies to deceive when their intent is to mask realist behaviors with liberal rhetoric. Leadership uses this tactic to justify action when it perceives the public cannot accept the truth. The strategy is also utilized when elites seek to further their own political agendas through invoking the national interest. Accordingly, the action is recognizable when elites act like realists and talk like idealists.¹³ A state partaking in strategic deception will speak in grandiose tones to divert attention away from its less virtuous actions. It is symptomatic of regimes that value ends over means.

1.4 COSTS OF ALLIANCE

Generally, policy makers are only concerned with domestic public opinion if it is

negative and prohibits action.¹⁴ In the absence of backlash, leaders will feel free to craft policy as they please with minimal interference. The public in democratic societies can hold leadership accountable by bringing issues to the collective forefront. In the absence of unrest, legislators will dictate the focus of discourse along their own preferred terms.

Foreign policy decisions can incur negative effects internally when viewed under a negative light by the public. The public holds leaders in check through tipping points in opinion occurring at, "the moment at which a large portion of the public begins to demand that the government address its concerns."¹⁵ The phenomenon is more prevalent in democratic societies, such as the U.S., where leaders depend on public approval for political capital. The effects of international condemnation are less dramatic when the public perceives national security to be at stake. An example of this might include prolonged media coverage on a specific issue to the point where the public feels directly affected by action or inaction of their government abroad.

In addition, unpopular and failed policies can undermine American legitimacy on the international front as mounting pressures affect country-specific policy. Attacking U.S. legitimacy is preferred by rogue states to further undermine American clout. American support of illiberal regimes can reinforce preconceived notions that the world's reigning superpower does not abide by the beliefs it preaches and exports.¹⁶ The more

¹² John Mearsheimer. "Lying in International Politics," Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 22, 2004.

¹³ Mearsheimer (2004).

¹⁴ Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz. "Defining the American Public Opinion/ Foreign Policy Nexus" *Mershon International Studies Review* Vol. 42 No. 1 (May 1998).

¹⁵ Daniel Yankelovich. "The Tipping Points" *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2006).

¹⁶ James Morrow. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggression Model of

averse a population is to American actions seen as 'illegitimate,' the more the leadership in these nations feels pressure to cast a critical eye to the U.S.

The failure of U.S. diplomats to stand by their statements can undercut American credibility abroad. A state incurs negative impact if commitments are reneged upon and future interaction is strained when diplomatic statements are no longer seen as credible.¹⁷ Mised actors will not be likely to trust again, as losing face is not an acceptable diplomatic outcome. Statesmen who fail to punish a transgressor also run the risk of appearing soft to friends and appearing weak to potential adversaries.

1.5 BENEFITS OF ALLIANCE

International alliances are beneficial when they address a state's needs without incurring excessive cost. States, depending on their standing within the international system, will have different reasons for seeking out alliances. Relatively weaker states will often form alliances to enhance their own security and ability to counter threats. Stronger states take calculated risks and pair up to gain freedom of action and improve upon the already beneficial status-quo. The strong sacrifice marginal amounts of security by opening themselves up to additional sources of conflict. Each member stands to gain when engaged in asymmetric alliance as less critical dimensions, either autonomy or security, are sacrificed for more pressing needs.¹⁸

Alliances" *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 35.

¹⁷ Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith. "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crisis" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 46 No. 2 (April 2002): 176.

¹⁸ James Morrow. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggression Model of Alliances" *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 35.

The United States engages in asymmetric alliances with less powerful states as it possesses the luxury of having its immediate security needs already met. It seeks out new partners to alter the status quo in strategic arenas.¹⁹ Asymmetric alliances can last indefinitely when the arrangement remains mutually beneficial. For example, the U.S. gains considerably when allowed to stage troops on foreign soil and increase influence in regional forums. Even the international system's dominant component, the U.S., is not without peer competition, as it engages in asymmetric alliances to check the growth of rising states and promote its vital interests abroad.

2.0 EGYPT - A STRANGE BEDFELLOW

Strategic alliances are nothing new in U.S. foreign policy. American policy makers struck an initial alliance with Egypt, beginning in 1979, with the intent of improving regional standing. The relationship has been mutually beneficial; the United States gained a valuable ally in the Arab world and Egypt received the aid necessary to build a sustainable economic infrastructure. The alliance has been historically strong despite Egyptian human rights transgressions and the continued threat posed by terrorism that mars interaction. Despite these concerns, American aid has continued to flow freely to Cairo. The U.S. has provided Egypt with an annual average of over \$2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979, second only to Israel over the prescribed period.²⁰

¹⁹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. *Principles of International Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2003).

²⁰ Clyde R. Mark. "Egypt - United States Relations" *Issue Brief for Congress* (April 2, 2003).

2.1 COSTS

Legitimate sources of concern mark American relations with Egypt. The state has shown highly troubling tendencies including: the prosecution of whistleblower judges, round-ups of democratic activists, and most recently violence against peaceful demonstrators.²¹ In addition, according to the Department of State, “there is convincing evidence that the Egyptian police use torture to extract confessions, and detain suspects without charge or trial.”²²

The U.S. has continued to lend support to the current Mubarak regime since it assumed power in 1981 despite the increased presence of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egyptian government. The radical Islamist group preaches a Salafist interpretation of Islam, echoed readily in the rhetoric of Al-Qaeda. The MB was formally banned by the state in 1954, but in reality the Egyptian government has allowed it to operate within limits since the 1970’s, attempting to keep the group in check with frequent arrests and crackdowns.²³ Pressures exerted on the standing government to corral the group have fallen on hard times of late. Running on the creed “Islam is the Answer”, the MB listed 150 members as independent candidates in the 2005 Parliamentary elections with little secret about their Brotherhood affiliation. The MB claimed 88 seats and now comprises nearly a quarter of the main legislative body.²⁴

Another cause for concern is virulent anti-American rhetoric emanating from members of the Egyptian government and

elite. These voices have been more audible after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The war was castigated by many as an example of American double standards, which allow Israel to possess advanced weaponry but justifies the invasion of other states with similar ambitions.²⁵ A statement issued by the assembly's General Committee in 2003 decreed the war against Iraq as unjust and in violation of the principles and charter of the United Nations. It deserves mention that although Egypt officially condemned the Iraqi War, the Parliamentary statement never made specific mention to the United States. The strength of the bilateral alliance was evident when, as a result of unrest created by the decree's failure to implicate the U.S., a pair of Nasserite members of Parliament were arrested for allegedly inciting and participating in anti-American protests.

2.2 BENEFITS - INFLUENCE IN THE DESERT

The primary U.S. interest in maintaining strong relations with Egypt is to capitalize on the state's leadership role in the Arab world. Often, other Arab states look to Egypt to initiate action or to serve as an example on regional conflicts.²⁶ The United States looks primarily to Egypt, the first Arab state to recognize Israel, to soothe contentious attitudes in the Arab world. In addition, Egyptian diplomats often have influence in setting agendas and articulating moderate positions in regional bodies such as the Arab League.

Two decades of military cooperation and training have kept Egypt's military establishment, the most powerful state institution, a temperate and reliable U.S. partner. As benefits of cooperation outweigh

²¹ Jane Morse. “Bush Administration Supports Continued Assistance to Egypt” *Department of State* (May 17, 2006).

²² Ibid.

²³ Sharon Otterman. “Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections” *Council on Foreign Relations* (December 1, 2005).

²⁴ Nabil Abdel-Fattah. “How the Brotherhood Won” *Al-Ahram Weekly Issue 775* (December 29, 2005).

²⁵ Gamal Essam El-Din. “Parliamentary Rage” *Al-Ahram Weekly Issue 631* (March 27, 2003).

²⁶ Mark (April 2, 2003).

costs, relations have continued largely unabated. During the Gulf War, Egypt's support was central to Arab participation in the war against Iraq.²⁷ The continued support of the Egyptian government and intellectual elite fulfills a purpose that outweighs the animosity of individuals in other strata of civil society.

2.3 ANALYSIS - WHY THE U.S. HAS NOT CUT TIES WITH EGYPT

The U.S. has not severed this strategic relationship because the investment still serves an important function. Support has been lent on a near continuous basis because the U.S. is still readily concerned with security in the Middle East. Funding to Egypt ensures continued support of American interests in the Arab world. The U.S. would cut ties if the primary conditions for alliance were broken; if Egypt ceases to lend adequate support to the ongoing GWOT or if radical elements alter domestic policy away from perceived American interest. Despite an unlikely fit, savvy statesmen from both Egypt and the U.S. have seized on the partnership as both sides stand to benefit.

As Egypt continues to enact a perceived role in American grand strategy, the U.S. government will continue to look the other way on human rights violations and other illiberal practices. Egypt will continue to be a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East despite its internal struggles, the threat presented by terrorism and harsh anti-American rhetoric. U.S. military aid to Egypt has created a solidly pro-American military establishment, which is the strongest institution in the state and forms the core of the Mubarak regime. Twenty years of military cooperation have led to an Egyptian military leadership increasingly comfortable with

²⁷ "Strengthening the U.S.-Egyptian Relationship" *Council on Foreign Relations* (May 2002).

American approach and doctrine.²⁸ Angry government rhetoric, employed to convince a skeptical public that Cairo is not squarely in Washington's back pocket, will not jeopardize what has been a long-term effective alliance. The current establishment is strong, a result of copious levels of external funding, and although the Muslim Brotherhood achieved its highest level of parliamentary representation, Hosni Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) maintains an overwhelming majority.²⁹

The U.S. would most likely sever ties not when the state shows illiberal tendencies, which it has, but if Egyptian statesmen stopped representing U.S. will at home and in Arab regional forums. Egypt's repressive practices have not drawn the ire of the U.S. as pro-American interests continue to consolidate power.

3.0 PAKISTAN - A NEW STRANGE BEDFELLOW

Relations with Pakistan took on new meaning in 2001. To put it plainly, a failed Pakistan is seen as an unacceptable reality by the Bush Administration. Securing the state from extremist elements has been imperative due to the nebulous threat presented by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan fits neatly within American grand strategy as a 21st century domino of marked importance. Its recovery as a healthy state with functioning institutions is a critical prerequisite for promoting American security in South Asia and limiting the effects of terrorism.³⁰ Pakistan is simply too big and potentially too

²⁸ *Council on Foreign Relations* (May 2002).

²⁹ William Wallis. "Egypt relies on prosperity to dazzle critics" *Financial Times* (November 17, 2006).

³⁰ Teresita C. Schaeffer. "U.S. Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities" *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2002-03):169.

dangerous for the U.S. to allow it to succumb to its more radicalized elements.³¹

3.1 COSTS

There is no shortage of potential costs associated with the U.S. strategic partnership with Pakistan. Excessive reliance on Pervez Musharraf is cause for concern as his grip on power is tenuous given the number of threats to his rule. In addition, excessive corruption endemic to the state might eventually test the will of American politicians, who are subject to harmful public opinion. The potential bruising of its international reputation is an acute risk as U.S. standing abroad is currently low due to the War in Iraq. Most importantly, there is credible evidence suggesting that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban still maintain a heavy presence in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. In addition, support of Pakistan is contingent upon the state limiting the terrorist threat, and their success in this capacity is difficult to gauge.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, the domineering head of the state, is at the center of the storm. American relations with Pakistan are essentially forged with the man himself, so much so that he has been called the "linchpin in the U.S.'s war against terrorism" by members of the administration.³² If Musharraf were to fall out of favor with the military, the backbone of the state and Pakistan's only viable institution, there is good chance he would be overthrown.³³ U.S. strategic interests would be left in peril if this scenario were to play out, as there is little evidence that future leadership would be as receptive to American overtures as the current

leadership has been. The two states have not always possessed strong ties with one another and relations were particularly rocky at specific times during the Cold War.

Furthermore, Pakistan consistently tops Transparency International's listing of the world's most corrupt states. It ranked 132 of 146 according to the organization's 2004 Corruption Perception Index.³⁴ The Pakistani police forces were singled out as the most egregious offenders. It is imperative that aid not support avenues counter productive to the American interest, a stronger possibility given Pakistan's propensity for institutional dishonesty.

Most specifically, the heavy flow of U.S. support and resources thrown behind Musharraf is dependent upon his ability to corral dangerous terrorist groups operating in his state. The point has been a source of contention between Musharraf and Afghani President Hamid Karzai. Critics and Karzai in particular have accused Pakistan of allowing the Taliban to use its territory as headquarters for attacks on western troops in Afghanistan.³⁵ U.S. officials have exercised caution in toeing a line between the two states, as each is of strategic importance to the GWOT. Afghani security officials claim trails of bombers carrying out a rising number of suicide attacks trace back to northwest Pakistan.³⁶ Others believe Pakistan is not doing enough to stop its one-time protégé, the Taliban, and other militant groups from operating along its lawless frontier territories.

International legitimacy and credibility are additional potential costs associated with American support of a failing, illiberal state.

³¹ Stephen Philip Cohen. "The Nation and the State of Pakistan" *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 109.

³² Hannah Bloch. "Vote for Me-Now" *Time Magazine* (April 29, 2002).

³³ Anatol Lieven. "The Pressures on Pakistan" *Foreign Affairs Vol. 81 No. 1* (January/ February 2002).

³⁴ "2004 Annual Report" *Transparency International*.

³⁵ Declan Walsh. "Pakistan sheltering Taliban says British Officer" *The Guardian* (May 19, 2006).

³⁶ Carlotta Gall. "The Reach of War; Pakistan Link Seen in Rise in Afghan Suicide Attacks" *New York Times* (November 14, 2006).

The U.S. cannot push forward in the GWOT without allies. Events in Iraq have reinforced the doubts of the already skeptical and led allies to question the supposedly benign foundations of U.S. intent. The botched war in Iraq has limited the U.S. margin for error on the international stage. Leaders comprising the slim coalition of the willing have suffered domestically and will be wary of lending unqualified support for the United States again.

3.2 *BENEFITS - A USEFUL ADVOCATE*

Relations between the U.S. and Pakistan are best characterized by, "overlapping interests but differing priorities."³⁷ Each stands to benefit from the relationship, and each faces opposition to maintaining ties. Pakistan, specifically President Musharraf, is in a precarious position. He is tasked with holding a tenuous balance between loyalties to the Muslim world and building the nation's economic infrastructure, said to be in a state of near-collapse before being rescued by massive debt write-off and aid in the wake of 9/11.³⁸

Musharraf's political livelihood depends on balancing many competing interests; including the constant threat of conflict with India and pressures from domestic fundamentalist groups upset with his increasingly moderate tone. He has pegged his political fortunes so closely to the United States that critics have mockingly dubbed him "Busharraf".³⁹ Musharraf is reliant upon the might of the United States because Pakistan dedicates nearly a quarter of its total budget towards defense.⁴⁰ Despite costs incurred, the

relationship with the U.S. is strategically imperative to Pakistan, as an increased American presence is vital in limiting the Indian threat and allowing the state an opportunity to dedicate resources away from defense and towards economic development.

The United States looks to Pakistan as a key ally in South Asia. It is a self-proclaimed Islamic state bound to neighboring India by geography, culture, and chronic enmity. U.S. rationale for support is clear. The potential for state collapse will continue to drive interest. The fear of state failure is magnified in the Pakistani case as alternatives in leadership are largely unknown. Musharraf secures additional benefits by seizing upon this notion to play on American fears that more radical elements would seize power if his regime were to fall.⁴¹

3.3 *ANALYSIS - WHEN THE U.S. WILL CUT TIES*

The U.S. will pull support if its grand strategic desire for regional stability is compromised by inaction of the Pakistani government. Musharraf is viable in the eyes of American diplomats as he controls the military and is in the best position to enact the will of the U.S. He is the best option available to the U.S. and will have support as long as he shows the ability "to keep pressing everyone ahead to deal with the threat."⁴² Assistance is ultimately bound to Musharraf's ability to hold the state together with healthy levels of U.S. financial support. This is no easy task as the country's population remains fractured by ethnic and linguistic differences with Islam used as the common bond in an attempt to achieve unity.⁴³

³⁷ Schaeffer (Winter 2002-03): 169.

³⁸ Stephen P. Cohen. "Pakistan and the Crescent of Crisis" *Brookings Institution* (April 20, 2005).

³⁹ Anthony Spaeth. "Pakistan - Dangerous Ground" *Time Magazine*.

⁴⁰ "Kashmir dreaming," *The Economist Volume 380 Issue 84/85* (July 8, 2006): 10-11.

⁴¹ Stephen M. Walt. "Taming American Power" *Foreign Affairs* (September/ October 2005).

⁴² Remarks by Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Department of State (June 27, 2006).

⁴³ Husain Haqqani. "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future" *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2004-05).

The 9/11 commission echoed the condition perfectly when it stated that, “Musharraf’s government represents the best hope for stability in Pakistan.”⁴⁴

The marriage is one of convenience to support the U.S. goal of finding a strong Muslim ally in South Asia. The U.S. has little interest in choosing sides in an Indian-Pakistani conflict and will continue to avoid taking a side unless necessary. It is apparent that U.S. policy makers have little concern about military rule in Pakistan. They might even prefer it, as strong rule of law can be more effective in limiting the negative effects of radical elements in the state than democratic practice.

In regards to a tipping point in US domestic politics, support to Pakistan will not be directly affected by American public opinion. The events of 9/11 still burn in the collective psyche much as the bombing of Pearl Harbor did generations prior. American statesmen do their best to avoid listening to public opinion under normal circumstances. In perilous times, when national security concerns are more pronounced, they are even less likely to respond to criticisms as greater latitude is furnished by the people. The American government will continue to pay lip service to such haughty liberal notions as fair elections, transparency, and cooperation between the standing governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Efforts might be made to assuage public concerns, but these will have little impact in the alteration of American policy.

4.0 COMMON THREADS - WHAT EGYPT CAN TELL US ABOUT PAKISTAN

There are common themes worth noting in U.S. formal support of Egypt that

⁴⁴ Ashley J. Tellis. “U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan’s Transformation” *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 28 No. 1 (Winter 2005).

we can expect to see in Pakistan. Egypt is already a top recipient of U.S. aid and Pakistan will soon follow suit if the state is able to show returns. Pakistan has already climbed to seventh in funds received from the U.S. in fiscal year 2004, netting \$390 million. The numbers are somewhat misleading as they fail to account for military assistance in the amount of \$1.5 billion for foreign military financing to be paid from 2005-2009 and an additional \$110 million pledged after the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. The U.S. has also sold Pakistan a number of advanced weapons systems including: TOW 2A missiles, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, AH-1 Cobra Helicopters, and Harpoon missiles.⁴⁵

American support in Egypt is rooted to the military establishment, as the armed forces under Mubarak are the state’s most powerful institution. The condition is echoed in Pakistan, as Musharraf, a General before seizing power in 1999, relies excessively on support of the military to sustain his regime.⁴⁶ The apparent success behind U.S. funding of the Egyptian military establishment is likely to occur again in Pakistan under largely similar circumstances.

Illiberal rifts evident in the Egyptian political landscape also appear in Pakistan. American support has been lent continuously to Egypt for almost 30 years despite a clear terrorist presence, ample levels of anti-U.S. sentiment, and evidence pointing to police torture.⁴⁷ American bark on the spread of liberalism has proven itself far worse than its bite as funding levels have remained strong.

⁴⁵ “Defense Department Statement on Pakistan Partnership,” United States Department of Defense No. 190-06 (March 4, 2006).

⁴⁶ Mubarak is also a military man serving first as a bomber pilot and then as Commander of the Air Force and Deputy Minister of War before being appointed Vice President in 1975.

⁴⁷ In the 2004 Corruption Perception Index which ranked Pakistan 132 of 146, Egypt was ranked 78th.

Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that support will be cut to Pakistan because of similar activity as long as Musharraf remains loyal to the United States which he has every incentive to do.

The challenges faced by Pervez Musharraf are multifaceted, but hardly unique. Many of the same conditions were in place for Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat during the late 1970's. The choice was simple; Sadat had fought two wars against Israel, gaining widespread credibility in the Muslim world for, along with Syrian forces, pushing the Israel Defense Forces to the limit in October of 1973. Sadat, much like Musharraf, decided that a strategic partnership with the United States was worth pursuing. The reasons were much the same. Sadat realized that reaching a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was a precondition for Egyptian economic development.⁴⁸ Sadat was willing to sacrifice part of his reputation in the Islamic world, as Musharraf is today, to secure economic spoils from the United States and secure his state's future.

Alliance with Egypt is dependent upon the state's leadership in the Muslim world. Egypt is counted on to carry the American torch in the Arab community, as Pakistan will be expected to in predominately Muslim South Asia if and when it is able to curb the terrorist threat. U.S. efforts in Pakistan will focus on stabilization in the short-term and regional leadership in the near future. Admittedly, Pakistan is in a more precarious position than Egypt was in 1979. It faces a larger, hostile nuclear rival and more tumultuous domestic factions, two concerns the Egyptians did not contend with to the same extent.

⁴⁸ Mohamed Kadry Said. "Assessing the United States-Egyptian Military and Security Relations" *Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies* (February 9, 2004).

5.0 COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

There are a number of credible alternatives experts have seized on to explain U.S. support for Pakistan. I will address two; the first asserts that American support would be lent regardless of Pakistani leadership, in essence taking to task my belief that U.S. support is reliant on Musharraf. The other claims that mounting negative opinion will exert enough pressure on prominent statesmen to cut support to Pakistan, casting doubt on my belief that tipping points are ignorable unless heard at a fever pitch.

It is possible that American support for Pakistan has little to do with Musharraf. Some have claimed the U.S. would prefer to support a different more democratically-friendly leader better equipped to secure American interests. The true test of such a hypothesis would take place if and when a transition occurred and the U.S. was forced to declare allegiance. It is likely such a transition in power would be undemocratic, a coup no doubt, as that is how Musharraf initially claimed power. If an American vision is rooted in the state and not the man, it implies that Musharraf is a smaller cog in a larger process and my belief that American support is linked to current leadership is incorrect.

If the U.S. is not pegged to support of Musharraf we would have to imagine a new leader on the horizon more agreeable to American interests. The chances of this, in a fiercely anti-American state, are minimal. In addition, money already invested in Musharraf would be wasted sunken costs, as the process of accruing support would have to begin anew. I believe support will be lent to any strong leader capable of controlling the military as it offers the best chance to curb the threat posed by extremists. Musharraf is simply the best bet in this capacity and that is why the U.S. will support his regime over unknown alternatives.

Proponents claim that in certain instances the power of public opinion has the ability to alter grand strategy. The effect would most likely be felt domestically and could occur when the American collective consciousness shifts from Iraq towards other parts of the world. It is possible that the public could reach a critical “tipping point” and force edgy legislators already nervous about supporting Pakistan into altering policy. On the international stage, increasing grassroots frustration with perceived American imperialism could put pressure on foreign governments to act. If public opinion in either scenario were to incur such an effect, it would imply that the ties to Pakistan would be cut sooner than predicted.

There is little to suggest that the focus of the American public will shift away from Iraq anytime soon. It has been a staple of public discourse since talk of invasion first surfaced in 2002 and will be for the discernible future. On the international front, there is a loose collection of international actors that oppose the U.S. and another coalition that tends to lend support. The composition of those groups generally remains static; the U.S. knows which states it can count on (the UK for example) and which it cannot (Iran and North Korea to name a few). It is unlikely, however, if the issue is cast in terms of security and the national interest, that public sentiment would lead to a significant alteration in policy.

6.0 CONCLUSION

Grand strategy trumps all peripheral matters in dictating foreign policy focus and the formation of statecraft. The events of 9/11 cemented a framework to guide American foreign policy, much as events associated with the Cold War had prior. The attack on domestic soil rocked the collective mindset and shifted strategic needs towards ensuring U.S. security in contentious avenues of the

world. The immediate goals of American support of Pakistan will aim at limiting the threat presented by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Longer term grand strategic success is possible and will depend on the creation of powerful, regional allies, such as Pakistan, to protect American interests. The state is a valuable piece of the American security puzzle that should not be discarded prematurely.

It is my contention that American relations with Pakistan will continue unabated as long as conditions remain in place. The U.S. will lend support to the military-led rule of Musharraf as an alternative would disregard sunken efforts already extended. It is also unlikely future leadership would be as conducive to American interests in South Asia. The long run of American support for Egypt has shown that strategic partnerships struck with the Muslim world can stand the test of time. It is evident that alleged human rights violations have had little effect on U.S. funding and support for the Egyptian government. American politicians critical of support lent to Egypt should imagine a Middle East free of their relatively moderate influence. The same could be said in Pakistan, where tangible gains from an imperfect alliance are far preferable to idealism preached from atop a soapbox.

American statesmen will continue to support Pakistan despite domestic and international costs incurred. Statecraft is an inherently strategic business and relations are positive when perceived benefits trump costs. The relationship with Pakistan is beneficial and should be nurtured as it offers a healthy return on investment and additional leverage in a dangerous corner of the world.