Pakistan: Implications of Insecurity and Policy Prescriptions.
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Introduction

Since 2001, Pakistan and the United States have publicly been steadfast allies in the war on terror. Privately, however, both countries have pursued their own divergent national interests. The United States has sought to counter terrorism, build regional stability, and spread western ideology, and Pakistan has sought to counter its local rivals and extend a semblance of regional hegemony. Numerous militant groups based within Pakistan further complicate the alliance, with some loyal to the Pakistani government (to varying extents) and others independent or even hostile. As Pakistan and the United States each seek to shape their preferred south Asian security landscape, it is the actions of these myriad groups which most confuse the path forward. Yet, in spite of preferring different outcomes in south Asia, both Pakistan and the United States share two core vital interests – promoting regional stability and limiting the threat non-state actors pose to state stability. Current U.S. foreign policy does not take advantage of these shared interests as it should, and as a result progress in the region is lackluster, bilateral relations are deteriorating, and contrary to both countries' desires, insecurity in Pakistan is growing.

Trends of Insecurity

Even prior to the September 11th attacks, the internal security of Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal was causing global concern. Since then, the situation has only worsened: the country's economy has shrunk $43 billion, over nine-thousand civilians have been killed, there have been two presidential assassination attempts, and a number of other key politicians were in fact killed. Terrorist attacks increased 43% in 2008 and an additional 49% in 2009 (Shah 2010).

Pakistan's military, long hailed as the guardian of the state, increasingly seems to be losing control of internal security. Its previous uneasy coexistence with extremist groups based in the frontier regions has given way to outright battle, with militants for the first time encroaching upon the military's core areas of control. In early 2009, four-thousand extremists even took control of the relatively wealthy, liberal Swat Valley, imposing sharia law for months before the military recovered the area (The New York Times 2010). Infiltration has also affected military control. The two assassination attempts against President Musharraf in 2003 were carried out by al-Qaeda fighters with the cooperation of Pakistani Air Force officers (Hussain 2004). Later that year, militants managed a brief takeover of Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi, killing twenty-three people while wearing Army uniforms and demonstrating familiarity with the complex's layout (Perlez 2009). Furthermore, in May 2011, militants assaulted a Karachi naval base just blocks from a nuclear fuel storage facility. They reached sensitive American and Chinese portions of the base and destroyed two of Pakistan's four PC-3 surveillance aircraft in an attack that continued unstopped for nearly fourteen hours. The attack was cited as revenge for recent steps by the Navy to purge al-Qaeda members from its ranks, and its sophistication suggested that sensitive information had been passed along by infiltrators working inside the base (Masood and Sanger 2011). Additionally, countless low-ranking recruits, several officers, and most recently and notably an Army brigadier have been dismissed for ties to extremist groups. Thus, the infiltration of Pakistan's military, combined with the increasing conflict the military faces, seriously threatens Pakistan's internal security.

This growing inability to provide security has also further delegitimized Pakistan's already historically weak political government. In many areas where state authority is weak or absent, its

role is supplanted by strong, radically Islamic networks of schools and charities. These networks inflame notions of religious conflict, glorify martyr ideology, and fuel anti-Indian rage, fashioning new terrorist ideologues from the youth and providing safe harbor for likeminded militants from abroad. Furthermore, in the wake of Pakistan's devastating 2010 floods, these networks often provided rescue and aid more quickly than the government, showcasing greater capability, legitimacy, and authority than the government (Sciutto 2010).

Government incompetence and a broken political system have also spurred an economic crisis in Pakistan. The country's wealthiest citizens pay virtually no tax and the government is unable to agree upon much needed systemic reforms of the financial system (Tavernise 2010). In this way, religious extremism and government ineptitude weaken Pakistan's political institutions and act as self-reinforcing factors – both causes and effects in the country's destabilization. Current U.S. development efforts do little to address these root problems of Pakistan's destabilization, just as current U.S. foreign policy does not best take adequate of mutual interests in structuring an effective bilateral partnership.

International Consequences of an Insecure Pakistan

If Pakistani security continues to erode, it would negatively affect international security in three alarming ways. First, Pakistan's role as a breeding ground and refuge for globally active terrorist cells would increase. Osama bin Laden and many other al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders have found training and refuge in Pakistan from which to project a global reach, as have Americans such as the "Times Square bomber" Faisal Shahzad (BBC 2010). Indeed, Pakistan-based terrorist groups have seen a fair level of success in spite of reasonable state security earlier

this past decade, so if internal security were to collapse such terrorist successes would surely multiply.

Second, a destabilized Pakistan would facilitate the growth of regionally-focused terrorist groups, and undermine nascent security gains in Afghanistan and India. Militants based from within Pakistan have long waged war on India, and are responsible for much of the violence in Kashmir as well as the 2008 Mumbai attacks (NPR 2011). The remnants of the Afghan Taliban, the Quetta Shura, have made their home in Pakistan and direct much of the Afghan insurgency from there (Roggio 2010). The Haqqani network, responsible for the September 2011 U.S. embassy bombing in Afghanistan and closely tied to both al-Qaeda and the Taliban, is also based in Pakistan (Healy and Rubin 2011). Presently, many of these regionally-focused terrorist cells operate within relative confines set by Pakistan's military-intelligence sector – despite U.S. objections (Perlez Sanger and Schmidt 2011). However, if Pakistani internal security were to further decline, more cells would have the opportunity to strengthen, expand, and operate independently of any state control. This development would render these cells immune to any state-based deterrence negotiations, hinder democratization and peace in the region, and lead to a range of provocative situations involving India. Indeed, it is a stated interest of the United States that a "prosperous, secure, and stable Pakistan is vital to regional peace and security" (USAID 2011).

Lastly, rogue states and non-state actors could obtain elements of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal or the technology required to build their own. Pakistan has roughly one-hundred nuclear weapons deployed and possesses fuel for another forty to one-hundred. The vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear fuel supplies, specifically, was shown to cause concern among senior U.S.

officials in recently leaked diplomatic cables (Sanger and Schmidt 2011). Should Pakistan's security fail, then, international security would be threatened by two scenarios. In the first scenario, non-state actors, themselves invulnerable to the threat of mutually assured destruction, may obtain and use nuclear weapons. Barring successful theft of an operational nuclear weapon, radiological dispersal devices, or "dirty bombs," could be easily fashioned from weapons-grade fuel and detonated with similar effect. In the second scenario, rogue states could obtain Pakistani nuclear technology and expertise and develop their own weapons systems and proliferation networks, much as Pakistan's now-disrupted A.Q. Khan network successfully exported such expertise to North Korea, Libya, and Iran previously (Albright and Hinderstein 2011). Such a network would likely involve state-sponsors of terror, and consequently would also increase the future likelihood of the first scenario. A collapse of Pakistani security, then, would result in severe global consequences.

Foreign Policy Tools

The United States can address the aforementioned threats and strengthen international security in four main ways. In its international relationship with Pakistan, the United States can reorient its *deterrence* so as to prevent further international threats or erosion of Pakistani security. It can apply *compellence* in order to change specific, unproductive Pakistani policies. And, it can practice *diplomacy* in effort to work toward shared goals and compromises without resorting to the use of force. Within Pakistan, the United States can also utilize *development* to combat the root causes of the country's domestic and electoral instability. Properly distributing U.S. effort among these tools will create a robust foreign policy more effective at building Pakistani security.

Deterrence

Effective deterrence must be credible, directed towards actors with known locations and vulnerabilities, and strategically clear. When properly executed, deterrence discourages belligerency, and prompts those behaving peacefully to continue doing so. Maintaining credible deterrence over troops abroad, however, is inherently paradoxical; it requires a state to care more about goals in a foreign land than about the cost of lives and treasure required to achieve those goals (Schelling 1966, 35). The U.S. government has sought to overcome this paradox and build credible deterrence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by emulating homeland deterrence (placing troops in harm's way), creating and publicizing a rationalization of commitment, and involving national honor (Schelling 1966, 35-71). However, U.S. democratic mechanisms hold the government accountable to the people, and elections and opinion polls continue to undercut government attempts to build credibility by demonstrating that citizens are in fact quite war-weary (Gallup 2011; Gallup 2011). Since Osama bin Laden's death, calls for a hastened U.S. withdrawal have only increased (Trofimov, 2011). Thus, the commitment needed to demonstrate credible deterrence over U.S. troops in south Asia is lacking.

This credibility deficit is compounded by the landless, non-state nature of actors faced in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and other regional militants lack legitimate geographic sovereignty and thus are not vulnerable to retaliation – and deterrence – in the way states are. For this reason, such groups are also used by the Pakistani state to avoid the consequences associated with state-transgression of U.S. deterrence policy (Myers 2011). Of course, such affiliation is always denied or attributed to rogue elements, such as in the case of the "rogue" but now-pardoned nuclear-scientist A.Q. Khan or the planning of the Mumbai attacks (Albright and

Hinderstein 2005; NPR 2011). Presently, most such non-state actors (both independent and proxy) are treated internationally as the sole responsibility of the sovereign host. As such, deterrence against these groups is simply not possible.

Lastly, U.S. deterrence in Pakistan is weakened by lack of a transparent and unified strategy. If Pakistan and Pakistani militants cannot predict U.S. responses to aggression, then they cannot modify their behavior based on deterrence threats. U.S. retaliation against Pakistani and militant aggression has been inconsistent among opponents and disproportionate in response, undercutting the presentation of an understandable deterrence policy. Drone strikes have continued against militants regardless of the status of peace talks elsewhere. Secretary of State Clinton's "Fight, Talk, Build" strategy does not force militants to compliance or noncompliance, but instead lets them continue all behaviors and face no adjusted response. As a result, Pakistan and its non-state agents have been unaware of "red lines" that they cannot cross without provoking conflict, which has in turn led to many "bluffs" being "called," significantly reducing the usefulness of deterrence and latent power. For instance, elements within Pakistan routinely tip off of militants and were also likely aware of or complicit in the hosting of Osama bin Laden – the original reason the U.S. entered the region. Yet the United States has absorbed these transgressions with no retaliation other than harsh words (Bumiller 2011). Also, lack of a unified deterrence strategy facing opponents allows them to shift the resources of aggression to whichever actor is currently most invulnerable to retaliation – be it state, non-state agent, or independent non-state actor. Without a clear, unified U.S. deterrence strategy, these actors cannot understand how they should modify their behavior and do not even feel pressured to do so.

In sum, the United States has a woefully ineffective deterrence policy in Pakistan – if it has one at all. Deterrence should discourage others from initiating harmful action by promising retaliation. However, the U.S. presence in south Asia lacks credibility in its commitment, and is severely limited in its ability to retaliate against non-state actors. Most distressingly, the U.S. has not even ensured that a transparent and unified deterrence policy is understood by its opponents. As a result, Pakistan and Pakistani militants have had little fear of repercussions when attacking the United States.

Compellence

Compellence involves demanding a change in action from another, and aims to greatly harm an opponent until they comply, at which point it should end (Schelling 72-91). The United States has directed two major compellence efforts toward Pakistan – both relatively unsuccessful. First, the United States compelled Pakistan to join its war on terror shortly after the 9/11 attacks. Second, and ongoing, the United States carries out drone strikes on Pakistani militant leaders in response to their Afghan insurgency operations.

In compelling Pakistan to join the U.S.-led war on terror, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage held a conversation with Pakistani President Musharraf and allegedly threatened to bomb Pakistan "back to the stone age." Later that day, Musharraf agreed to take all actions requested by the United States, including "ending logistical support for Mr. Bin Laden and giving the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for military and intelligence flights" (Reuters 2006). However, though this compellence dramatically reversed Pakistani rhetoric and superficial behavior, it influenced the country's ideology and covert behavior much less.

The second U.S. attempt at compellence in Pakistan is its drone operations. Drone operations have consistently expanded since the United States entered south Asia, and they are responsible for killing a number of high-valued militants (Shane 2009). As a result, Pakistani militants have been battered and forced further underground; however, they have not ended their insurgency (Perlez and Shah 2010). This ineffective strategy and its lack of tangible results barely constitutes compellence, and may instead be simply a wasteful use of force. Indeed, the resultant anti-American backlash among Pakistani civilians has severely undercut bilateral diplomatic relations (Martin 2011).

Both of these U.S. attempts at compellence suffer from their macroscopic scale. In demanding Pakistan to join the war on terror, the United States is unable to effectively measure Pakistani compliance or hold them publicly accountable in the most important areas, such as covert assistance of non-state actors. Secretary of State Clinton misused compellence once again this October by broadly demanding Pakistan end its support of non-state agents; the state consequences of noncompliance were vague (Myers 2011). And, in consistently using drone strikes against Pakistani militants without comment, militants are not offered a clear path toward compliance. Moreover, these strikes engender significant anti-American blowback from the Pakistani populace, and undercut and interfere with diplomatic efforts.

Diplomacy

Much of the current diplomacy directed towards Pakistan has been "checkbook," or "tough" diplomacy. In the words of Senator Jon Kyl, this demands Pakistan "understand that [U.S.] support for them financially is dependent upon their cooperation with [the U.S.]" (AFP 2011). Such coercive diplomacy is more akin to deterrence and compellence and cannot accomplish

what true diplomacy can. True diplomacy's "chief purpose is to enable states to secure objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law" (Berridge 2010, 1). It should build on mutual interests, rather than focus on the most contentious issues. However, former Pakistani ambassador to the United States Tariq Fatemi has suggested U.S.-Pakistani diplomacy simply "lurches from crisis to crisis" (Fatemi 2011). U.S.-Pakistan diplomacy is reactive rather than proactive. It has had no great accomplishments in the past decade. It has been used to muffle crises arising from the use of force rather than to prevent the initial need for force.

Development

Development efforts in Pakistan are hindered by an overly broad focus. Rather than addressing the self-reinforcing factors responsible for Pakistan's downward spiral of security and governance,   they build basic infrastructure, promote gender equity initiatives, and finance rural health centers (USAID 2011). These initiatives, while noble, do little to combat the root causes of Pakistan's destabilization – extremism and systemically poor governance. Furthermore, such ambitious, unfocused, and sometimes unwanted development efforts often prompt anti-imperialist backlashes rather than building the goodwill they were designed to.

U.S. aid to Pakistan is also primarily not even directed toward civilian aid. In fact, it is largely aimed toward strengthening the Pakistani military and intelligence sectors, elements of which then regularly promote hostility toward the United States. Many funds are also lost due to corruption (Perlez 2011). In this case, U.S. development funds have accomplished little more than strengthening an opponent.

Policy Proposals

There is significant opportunity to improve U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan and avoid the dangerous consequences outlined above. The United States' erratic and ineffective deterrence policy must be reformulated to define clear, credible, and reasonable "red lines" and their associated proportional responses. Compellence must be limited and more precisely targeted to engender coercion and no longer undercut diplomatic efforts. Diplomacy itself must be significantly ramped up, and development must be made more efficient, effective, and strategic. This policy shift would result in enhanced diplomatic success, enhanced utility of deterrence and compellence, less civilian casualties and popular-opinion blowback, and a more conventional and "winnable" conflict going forward.

Deterrence Prescriptions

The United States must develop and publicize a unified and credible deterrence strategy which explicitly states reasonable red lines applicable to all actors and commits to significant responses if they are violated.

Domestic constraints prevent the United States from credibly claiming to desire a significant troop presence in south Asia, but they do not prevent a U.S. civilian commitment. By extensively engaging U.S. civilians in Pakistan and the surrounding region, and committing itself to their protection, the United States can reinforce the credibility of its deterrence. This will also dramatically improve diplomatic and development initiatives.

To make deterrence effective against the novel nature of some modern opponents, non-state aggressors in south Asia should be catalogued and declared either stateless or affiliated. Stateless non-state actors should be held by international law to be vulnerable to international action.

Affiliated non-state agents should be linked to their host states based on publicly provided evidence, and linkage strategies should then be developed holding states accountable for their proxies. It should be made clear that deterrence policies apply to the actions of either.

Compellence Prescriptions

U.S. compellence efforts must be small in scale, targeted, and precise. They should only occur if compliance can be properly measured and the gains outweigh the diplomatic costs.

Pakistan's involvement in the war on terror must be understood as a result of coercion, and going forward the United States must emphasize overlapping interests as the source of cooperation rather than compellence. Otherwise, an ally-in-name-only will continue to be the only result.

Drone operations should be taken over by the Department of Defense, which should publish a clear strategic doctrine for their use. Each drone strike should be commented on, and pathways towards compliance should be suggested. Lower-level militants should no longer be targeted due to their likelihood to overlap with the civilian population. Indeed, the unique ability of drones to wait tirelessly until a target is isolated must be taken advantage of, and all possible measures should be taken to minimize civilian casualties. The transparency behind these steps should make it clear that those choosing to more than casually involve themselves with militants will face consequences. These steps will decrease civilian casualties and lessen anti-American blowback. Diplomatic efforts will no longer be cut short by offensive interruptions. Publicizing the underlying strategic rationale of drone strikes and their capabilities will increase their utility in influencing militant behavior. Once a level of compliance is forthcoming, other issues should be "connected" slowly and steadily in order to build peace and to structure conflict conventionally.

Diplomacy Prescriptions

The United States, ISAF states, and Pakistan must begin proactive diplomacy and work toward benchmark goals aimed at successively less antagonistic operations. They should openly discuss future roles of influence in Afghanistan and NATO should define concessions likely to be made regardless in the future as linked to Pakistan's progress in other areas of negotiation. Non-state actors should also be brought to the table when possible, as should Saudi Arabia. The destructive Wahabbi form of Islam practiced by most extremists today originated in Saudi Arabia, and has spread from there to Pakistan mostly due to massive funding and support by Saudi Royals.

In the course of such diplomacy, the steps involved with a U.S. reformulation of deterrence and compellence can serve as bargaining chips. Gradually minimizing and eventually ceasing drone strikes, and allowing Pakistani-flagged drone strikes should both be offered as options available to Pakistan in return for cooperation. The latter could be accomplished by inviting Pakistani observers and decision-makers to participate in our ongoing drone program, rather than by ceding the sensitive technology to Pakistan itself. A new proactive diplomatic surge is also an opportunity to slowly catalogue non-state actors and their linkages, and formalize interactions with them.

Development Prescriptions

Development efforts will be more challenging. They must address Pakistan's root problems of extremism and a weak political system, and also its peripheral economic and legitimacy problems. These efforts must account for the public's zealous concerns over sovereignty; where development is known to be U.S.-funded it will be viewed imperialistically, regardless of

whether the development is wanted. The military's sensitivity to civilian rule and the military-intelligence sector's complicity with extremist groups must also be considered over the course of implementation.

To combat extremism, a well-funded, long-term, and multilateral program should focus on developing influential youth content that promotes credible domestic leaders who exemplify moderate Islam or secularism. The bulk of nonmilitary aid should avoid costly infrastructure and nation-building projects and instead assist with distributing robust and credible curricula that incorporate moderate Islam and combat radical ideology widely among schools and civic centers. International partners should support Pakistan's folding of Islamic schools into government schools where possible and dissolving of them where not, but should avoid overt roles in this likely contentious project.

To bolster the weak Pakistani government and improve its finances, military aid should immediately be linked with minor but successively demanding goals designed to increase civilian control of and participation in military planning. Nonmilitary aid should sharply increase in the near term, and then total aid should decline in accordance with a defined, public schedule. Throughout, the proportion of military aid should steadily shrink. Once the political system has been strengthened, continuation of nonmilitary aid should be linked to the passage of effective tax and financial laws. All efforts should be completed jointly with the Pakistani government. Highly visible roles for Pakistani government officials must be arranged for each project. The involvement of multilateral and regional Islamic partners should also be emphasized to avoid provoking anti-Western suspicion.

To reorient the Pakistani military's unproductive priorities, continuous and substantive negotiations between the Indian and Pakistani militaries should be aggressively facilitated at all levels of command. This should strengthen communication, build trust, and slowly reorient Pakistan's defensive posture toward internal threats and non-state actors. The current Pakistani inclination to grant India most-favored nation status should also be encouraged, to build trade ties and relax tension between the two rivals.

If implementation of any such development should suffer from corruption, funds should instantly be used to bolster a separate segment of the program, and implementation should only resume once a staff change has been made or the corruption has been otherwise addressed. This will increase the efficiency of development and strengthen Pakistani governance. Once a level of success is reached, aid should be drawn down and replaced in kind with favorable loans, and then eventually with market-rate loans.

Conclusion

Given the aforementioned consequences of Pakistani insecurity, the United States has compelling reason to reformulate its foreign policy toward Pakistan. Publicizing a clear and unified deterrence policy, performing more limited and precise compellence, and intensively increasing proactive diplomacy will do much to increase cooperation and predictability among Pakistan and Pakistani militants. Combining these efforts with development which addresses the root causes of Pakistani insecurity rather than the symptoms will further stabilize the region.

Reformulating the United States' use-of-force strategy and ramping up its diplomacy are inexpensive tools with great promise of increasing Pakistani stability, and neither requires Congressional approval. The targeted development prescriptions are also politically viable, as

they are less expensive than nation-building and their cost could be easily offset with funds saved from the military drawdown.

These policy prescriptions would result in enhanced diplomatic success, enhanced utility of deterrence and compellence, less civilian casualties and popular-opinion blowback, and a more conventional, predictable, and winnable conflict going forward. More importantly, they would greatly aid in reducing the chances of a rollback of South Asia's hard-earned stabilization progress, an expansion of sophisticated global terror networks, and the proliferation of nuclear technology among autocrats and terrorists.

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