Defining the Rogue State: A Definitional Comparative Analysis Within the Rationalist, Culturalist, and Structural Traditions

By Jason Rose

INTRODUCTION

In political science literature the term “rogue state” is used ostensibly to define a class of states that combines the seeming irrationality and fanaticism of terror groups with the military assets of states. It is a loose and controversial term. Over a decade ago the Clinton Administration went so far as to declare an abolishment of the term in favor of “states of concern.” Though it is a constant comparative term used in international relations and foreign policy literature, when pressed for a definition, comparative scholars and policy analysts define the rogue state using inconsistent criteria, differing macro-structural and behavioral benchmarks and employ contrasting theoretical frameworks.

This paper addresses the paucity of comparative scholarship concerning rogue states, and provides definitional rigor and analytical scrutiny within the framework of the structuralist, rationalist and culturalist comparative traditions with the aim of clarifying the term and purging the nascent scholarship of its inherent nebulosity. This paper does not use the term “so called rogue states” though – as we will see – it is arguably more accurate. For example, if rogue states are violators of the norms established by the “international community” – whatever that actually is – and the United States, Israel, Pakistan violate those norms, why then are they not considered rogue states? We provide answers to this question and establish a definition that satisfies this apparent double standard.

Little direct scholarship on rogue states seems to exist because rogues themselves come in disparate cultural and structural species and varied behavioral, descriptive breeds.

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Additionally, rogues – in its most often used context – are media favorites and thus seem to dominate international politics, yet are extremely scarce in number limiting researchers to small-N studies. But it is precisely their recent prominence on the international stage that begs their study. Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea are the most often studied rogue cases, yet no scholarship has produced a definition that satisfactorily takes into account the accusations against the United States being a hypocritical rogue state, while addressing that the former states need to be distinguished from the U.S.

This paper demonstrates that norms are a weak and muddled approach that nearly all literature employs to define the behavior of rogue states – confounding rather than clarifying rogue membership. Instead, this paper insists that future scholarship acknowledge interests and not norms as the definitional building-block of classifying rogue states. Corroborating evidence to support this clarified definition is provided through the scrutiny of the three comparative analytical traditions.

First we peer through the lens of rational analysis which shows how norms are cast aside when interests are at stake such as in our examination of Pakistan and subsequently dispel the myth that rogue states are irrational. Second, we use the culturalist approach to demonstrate a way of determining preferences and a hierarchy of interests through macro-cleavages between rogues and the West. Lastly, structuralism and institutional analysis along with selected structural variables will provide empirical and qualitative support for the primary argument that interests, not norms are the criteria for understanding and analyzing rogue state’s membership and behavior.
1. DEFINING THE ROGUE STATE

Should rogue states be classified as a separate and distinct genus from other states? Are they so different from other states as to deserve separate study? There are two prime arguments for and against this question. The argument against is most states engage in rogue behavior – even and especially great powers – and therefore “rogue” behavior is a matter of perspective. We will explain why then, only a handful of states are considered rogues. The case in favor of rogue uniqueness is that there are indeed a separate class of states with distinct properties and observable explanatory variables that set them apart from “normal states”.

Nearly all scholarship on rogue states gives short shrift to a specific set of explanatory variables and a concrete definition. The majority of scholarship on rogue states is about rogue states and extraneous variables that are congruent with “normal states” and their interests and not the variables that constitute the rogues themselves. Nearly all scholars dedicate little more than a paragraph to definitional issues. Most of these limited definitions, however, are correctly based on behavior. The lack of definitional scrutiny would obviate a clear understanding of what exactly a rogue state is, yet the many and varied definitions within different frameworks persist.

These comparativists presume that the rogue state is easy to define in one or two sentences. Others seem content with only a single criterion; to merely reproduce the U.S. State Department list of state sponsors of terror as a sufficient definitional foundation for identifying rogues. Princeton University’s dictionary defines the rogue state as “a state that does not respect other states in its international actions.” What is exactly meant by “respect” is not explained leaving this definition cryptic and unclear. The Oxford Dictionary of Politics prefers a

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more distinct behavioral criteria, with the definition of states that are “contemptuous of international norms, bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction and being state sponsors of terrorism.” International norms, as we shall see, are too often utilized as the definitional foundation to define rogues. These behavioralist definitional concepts, while most common, still differ with structuralist definitions where some analysts and scholars use the term “rogue state” and “dictatorship” interchangeably, often combining the type of government with the state behavior, as Thomas H. Henriksen does by employing terms such as “rogue dictators.” Henriksen’s insight however is not inaccurate because this combination of terms accurately portrays a sub-species of rogue states. In a dictatorship, the leader is the state. In other words, Moammar Gadhafi is Libya (prior to recent developments). Saddam Hussein is Iraq (or was prior to 2003). Kim Jong II is North Korea. Others are Assad in Syria, Castro in Cuba and the list goes on. In these cases, “rogue regime” and “rogue state” are interchangeable. Yet when it comes to Iran the better definition is the broader term of “rogue state” because no one leader in Iran is that country. Government type as an explanatory variable will be addressed further in a later section.

Other definitions meander from governments that ‘brutalize their own people, sponsor terrorism to violate human rights, seek weapons of mass destruction, threaten their neighbors and defy international law.’ But no single definition exists. Indeed, the paucity of available comparative scholarship on rogue state typology compels the mining of some comparative work from International Relations scholarship. The typology of rogue states is a neglected – though

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not ignored – topic of comparativists. We endeavor here to rigorously identify the proper
typology and provide the authoritative definition.

2. THREE DEFINITIONAL COMPONENTS: BEHAVIOR, POWER AND
CREDIBILITY

There are three prime components of definitional criteria for the rogue state. The first, as most
scholarship suggests, is behavioral, which consists of intent; the second is power and capability,
which is linked most closely with the third: credibility. Most scholarship on rogue states
confounds power and capability with behavior, leading to various and nebulous definitions and
incongruent analysis.

Behavior, the first of our three components, seems to be the central determinant of what
constitutes a rogue state, according to existing scholarship. When comparativists initiate
arguments with several explanatory variables they seem to always return to the single idea of
behavior. Still, there is no standard applied in defining precisely what behavior constitutes rogue
conduct.

Some scholars will address variables that cause rogue behavior in the context of their
own criteria, but for definitional issues it is the behavior itself that is the principal component.
Sean O’Brien and Doug Bond for example emphasize the variable of stability in their research
on rogue states. They reason that since instability – or recent instability – is conducive to
creating the explanatory variables that lead to rogue state behavior, then stability is a prime
component of defining the rogue state. However O’Brien and Bond never satisfactorily address
the fact that despite Iran’s recent electoral uproar, that country has had a stable regime since at
least 1981 and arguably since 1979. Syria, Libya, Saddam’s Iraq, North Korea and Cuba have

all been relatively stable regimes, yet their comparative work on rogue states fails to adequately address a central question: if weak civil society institutions, high degrees of social cleavage, stagnant political development and economic adversity are factors that instability breeds, why not go a step further and introduce those specific variables as the main defining characteristics and leave out stability entirely? Furthermore, these variables exist within many states that are not considered rogues and are at least partially absent in some states that are branded as rogues.

Moreover instability itself, instead of a catalyst for rogue state behavior may actually be an inhibitor of outwardly threatening – but not necessarily internally atrocious – conduct since massive instability can paralyze a state’s ability to act; or power – the second prime definitional component discussed above. O’Brien and Bond seem to confound power with behavior – or more accurately intent – leading to opaque definitional cognizance.

Elizabeth N. Saunders, while breaking down rogue states into sub-species of “pariah states,” “human rights abusers” and “failed states,” dissects not what rogue states are, but rather what they are not. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of these sub-groups. Saunders however, instead of defining rogues as a separate classification of states, defines on a behavioral basis the grouping of which rogues are not a subset. She calls this group – harkening to Hedley Bull’s *The Anarchical Society* – “international society.” She defines the rogue state as “a state that lies outside the bounds of ‘normal’ international relations.” This circuitous definitional path is constructive on some levels but while Rumi may have asserted in his famous poem that “things are revealed by their opposites,” classifying the peculiar phenomenon of rogues requires substantially more rigor than the argument of exclusion: “they are what they are not.”

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Saunders assumes that the rogue states are outcasts of the international system; indeed that they are not members of the so called “family of nations.” Yet, the fact that there is constant debate over which policy to employ to deal with rogues reveals that they are indeed a member of the “family.”

Saunders describes that family of “international society” as “defined according to shared ideas”: the values, norms, regimes, rules and practices (formal and informal) largely accepted by the vast majority of nations. Moving forward, we adopt the idea of an international society without accepting its limited scope of norms. Thus, as they relate to international society rogues could be defined in a behavioral framework as those few states that do not accept the shared ideas of the others. We must move this notion a step further, as shared ideas are subordinate to shared interests.

Vital to our definition then are the determinants of those values, norms and regimes. As Sauneder’s expounds:

Powerful states – or in the case of a unipolar system, the most powerful state – have the ability to put forward new ideas, to define (or redefine) international society, and to exclude those states that do not comply.

Power then is cardinal to the determinants because the most powerful states decide who the rogue states are; the least powerful cannot be rogues as they lack the capability to threaten; while medium powers retain sufficient power to menace other states, but insufficient strength to define the interests of international society. Rogues then will always be medium powers. Nevertheless, power is largely ignored when it comes to defining the rogue state in comparative literature.

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9 Ibid., 25.
Power gives the capability for a state to engage in rogue behavior. For example, if the Marshall Islands threaten the United States with ballistic missile, chemical weapons attack or financial support for global terrorist networks, it is – of course – not credible because it is one of the weakest and poorest states in the system. On the other hand, medium powers with substantial economic and/or military capability such as Iran and North Korea have tested powerful weapons and possess the resources that make threats credible.

We should not ignore the notion of applicability of power. The United States has the largest military on Earth. But it would not invade Canada over a trade dispute. Indeed, the constraints of norms on major powers allows for the concession of the far greater power in an enormously asymmetrical power relationship. The United States will not threaten the use of nuclear weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan because they are not credibly applicable in those circumstances. Therefore the credibility of threat is a key component to add to the stew of our slowly cooking definition.

We have, until now alluded to – but not addressed – the most overlooked component ignored in comparative scholarship: the notion of hypocrisy. Many analysts and scholars such as Noam Chomsky in his famous 1998 article titled appropriately “Rogue States” describes many non-rogue states as rogues. Chomsky in later interviews insists that by its own standards the United States is a rogue state because it had violated the sovereignty of Iraq with the 2003 invasion and subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Chomsky takes this position simply based on norms – defiance of international law. He, like most scholars is in error to do so. The idea that a rogue is against the norms of international society is not sufficient to define the rogue state, as in the case of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and therefore the Princeton definition is anemic

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and the Oxford/State Department definition deals only with the narrow behavior associated with terrorism and WMDs. Other scholars rely on U.S. governmental definitions and macro-structural mechanisms such as the employment of the superstructures of norms and regimes.

Lost in the scholarship of rogue behavior against explicit norms is the rogue behavior against implicit *interests*. Interests allow for an explanation of hypocrisy in labeling rogues. Michael Klare suggests that rogue states are a fiction for this very reason – though he fails to explicate it directly. Rogue states, according to Klare, are merely enemy states in which the United States describes as rogue to demonize and to build public support against, for the purpose of justifying higher defense expenditures.\(^\text{12}\)

The lowest hanging fruit within the definitional context is therefore, that of perspective. Yet perspective is barely addressed in existing literature because almost all the scholarship on rogues is written within the framework of a Western world-view. Saunders addresses the perspective problem by accurately pointing out that what the U.S. perceives as a rogue, to Europe may be merely a state acting in its own self interest to achieve its policy goals. If rogues exist – a definitive “if” according to Saunders – then their behavior would have to be clashing with and antagonistic to, an “international society” where norms, rules and regimes of acceptable behavior are largely undisputed.\(^\text{13}\)

Norms may be undisputed within the superstructure of regimes and international law; nevertheless, *interests* are not. This is the heart of the failure of the existing literature to consummate a definition of the rogue state that has explanatory value in all cases. Saunders fails to mention interests and, like Klare, only alludes to this idea by asking a compelling question:


Are rogue states simply “a new label for the enemies of great powers?” If this question is relevant then *interests* render *norms* a peripheral component. Therefore the key definitional insight of this paper is that interests are the main classifier of rogue states, not international norms as virtually all the scholarship incorrectly explicates.

3. THE PARADOX OF INTERESTS VS. NORMS:
THE MISSING DEFINITIONAL COMPONENTS OF ROGUE STATES

That rogue states act against established norms and regimes of international society presupposes that rogue behavior is sharply antagonistic to the *interests* of those states that make up international society. This may appear obvious, but the presumption is incorrect. Norms may be subsets of states’ interests but are not the interests themselves. An international norm is a reflection of the state(s) interests however, the state interests are not necessarily a reflection of international norms. Paradoxically, interests need to be distinguished from norms. Interests of international society may actually *conflict* with the established norms of international society because those norms may not suit the goals and interests of the major powers that established the norms in the first place. Again, the double standard is illustrative.

For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty outlines how states are allowed to pursue peaceful nuclear energy. Yet the United States insists that Iran’s conduct is rogue behavior for enriching uranium because American policymakers are reluctant to cede additional regional influence to the Islamic Republic which conflicts with U.S. interests. The United States supports the United Nations charter where the norm of self-determination is explicated. Yet the U.S. condemns the secessionist South Ossetia and Abkhazia from their Georgian ally because those provinces are pro-Russian and not pro-American. If the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial boundaries is the foundation for international law, why then, when

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14 Ibid., 23-53.
there were credible diplomatic alternatives still to be exhausted, did the United States decide to violate the sovereignty of Iraq in 2003 and depose Saddam Hussein? It was in the U.S. interest to ensure that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and rid the world of a “bad actor.” Pursuing WMDs is the gold standard of rogue state behavior, yet during the 1980s and 90s the United States refused to label its longtime anti-Soviet ally Pakistan as a rogue state and impose harsh sanctions as the Pakistanis not only built nuclear weapons but proliferated the technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. Interests also conflicted with norms in the case of Israeli behavior. The U.S. during the 1970s refused to label Israel a rogue long after its nuclear weapons program was established and following preemptive attacks on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear installations in 1981 and 2007 respectively.\(^{15}\) The United States and its leaders continually praise the idea of democracy as a right of mankind and as the one global social component to promote peace. Yet when it comes to recognizing the democratic election of leaders in nations that the U.S. government is at odds with, such as Hamas in Palestine, American leaders fail to accept the norm and only pursue their interest. It is appreciable hypocrisy, but it is the reality.

The above examples provide robust evidence that it is interests, not norms that are threatened by rogue states. All the literature is in error to state otherwise and misunderstands the nuts and bolts of power politics. We insist however that there is no value judgment in this analysis and it is not a criticism of the United States to acknowledge that it – like any other state – pursues its interest; though one could argue that the hypocrisy is either alternatively unconstructive or necessary depending on the specific case. These examples simply illustrate that interests and not norms reflect international society’s classification of rogues and that heretofore it has not otherwise been explicated. Klare and Chomsky could both have arrived at

this insight had they not had their reasoning clouded by political ideology and arguments framed in dogmatic and moralistic rhetoric.

Often, U.S. policymakers also frame the label of rogue within moralistic rhetoric which implies norms; however morality is subordinate to the tool of rhetoric to achieve national interest preferences. If objective morality – whatever that actually means – was the definer of rogue states, then interests and norms would always converge. Where interests and norms conflict, norms are subordinate. Wishful thinking comparativists have not sufficiently mined the IR literature to arrive at this key insight: that norms are not the primary benchmark of behavior within the definitional framework of rogue states as nearly all the literature argues – interests are.

4. A NEW DEFINITION

Behavior is therefore contingent on power, and both are the two pillars of the definition of the rogue state we give here. However, the applicability of power and power-capability itself must be addressed by credibility. With these components scrutinized within the context of interests, we can now arrive at a careful, coherent and concrete definition. Therefore:

Rogue states are states that possess the power and credibility to, and engage in behavior that sharply conflicts with the net interests of international society as defined by major powers.

5. ANALYSIS WITHIN THE COMPARATIVE TRADITIONS

Our definition, though an improvement on the descriptive utility of previous scholarship, is still lacking without further analytical rigor. Implied in our definition is that rogues are not major powers. Explicit in our definition is that rogues are at odds with at least one major power that
has sufficient clout on the international stage to label them as rogue on behalf of international society – though not all of international society may agree and the rogue itself, while sufficiently powerful to make credible threats lacks sufficient influence and strength to define those interests of international society. Our definition takes power and credibility into account. A rogue’s threat must be credible and the rogue must have the power to act. Our definition also allows room for the perception problems and hypocrisy addressed above.

These are several components that must be considered in the taxonomy of the rogue state. Moreover, no comparative examination of any class of states or the explanatory variables that define them would be sufficient without an analysis within the three comparative traditions of rationality, culture and structure.

5.1. RATIONALITY

Here we address rational choice only as it relates to rogue states. We do not attempt any resolution of the theoretical advocates or detractors of rational choice, nor do we address the juridical, classical image of the state because it is peripheral to the scope of this discussion on rogue states analysis. We do however presume that the classical image is an antiquated tool of analysis.

Rational choice makes the case that rogue states are simply states acting in their own self-interest. The rationality paradigm explores the behavioral aspects of state interaction – that states act strategically within the international system to increase their relative gains and minimize their losses. That is, states like “individuals make decisions that maximize the utility they expect to derive from making choices.”16 Though critics believe it is too reductionist and

simplified, this is the primary assumption of rational choice.\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, it is an alleged \textit{irrationality} that is often attributed to rogue states in the IR and foreign policy literature. Furthermore, the idea of rationality as a means of comparative analysis of rogues is barely mentioned in comparative literature, while rationality lies at the heart of our behavioral analysis.

In the rationalist perspective all states act rationally and in their own self-interest, though their outcomes \textit{ex post} may appear irrational. In other words, what appears as irrationality is merely rational behavior acting within uncertainty or misperception. \textit{Ex ante}, all actors must choose within its constraints to achieve its intended goals. As Margaret Levi states, “The outcome depends on the aggregation of these individual actions.”\textsuperscript{18} These outcomes are often undesirable, as illustrated theoretically in the “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” and practically in the following two case studies on North Korea and Iran, leading many analysts to conclude that rogue actors are irrational based on the outcome.\textsuperscript{19} The error of IR, foreign policy and much of the comparative literature on rogue states in their presumption of irrationality is that it is made \textit{ex-post} and perpetuated by imperfect information both by the actor (the state \textit{ex-ante}) within the system and the analyst (\textit{ex-post}). Rationality makes room for misperception and imperfect/incomplete information. If a policy outcome is disagreeable or even catastrophic it does not necessarily mean the actor was irrational.

For example, Kim Jong Il was portrayed in the Western media as an eccentric, irrational, unpredictable even maniacal dictator simply because the outcome of the 1994 “Agreed Framework” was that the strongman of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
“betrayed and cheated” on the agreement. The justification for this perspective was his apparent intransigence toward Western diplomacy, his extortion of concessions from the West using his nuclear weapons program and his constant belligerence to South Korea, its neighbors and allies. What is largely unreported in the Western media is that the two prior agreements with the West were both abrogated in part by the United States. The rationalist will point out that in the 1994 “Agreed Framework” under the Clinton administration the United States agreed to build light water nuclear reactors to start the future establishment of a modern energy grid and provide electricity throughout the DPRK. The United States stalled and failed to comply with the agreement, never building the reactors. The rationalist will argue that the North Korean leader had no choice but to attempt to extort the United States into compliance with the agreement or gain greater leverage over U.S. rational behavior by achieving an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. From the U.S. perspective the DPRK was unpredictable and irrational engaging in rogue behavior against its interests. However, an unbiased assessment by the rationalist could conceivably predict the undesirable outcome ex ante because the agreement was not mutually enforceable.

In another example; for over three decades Iranian action has been labeled as rogue behavior starting with the U.S. Hostage Crisis in 1979. Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, in direct violation of international society’s norms of immunity for diplomats, out of what appeared to be irrational, nihilistic rage following decades of actual and perceived Western oppression. For many analysts, provoking the most powerful actor in the system was proof that Iranian leadership was irrational. However, the analysis alleging national pathology fails to acknowledge that the students in Tehran attacked the American embassy for a specific reason that made very good rational sense to them.
In 1951 the Iranian people led by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh wrestled power away from the monarchy, reducing the Shah to a figurehead and established a parliamentary democracy. Mossadegh nationalized the Iranian oil industry, which was owned by Western powers. In 1953 the United States and Britain overthrew Mossadegh and restored the pro-Western Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi back to power via a CIA coup d’état led from the basement of the U.S. embassy.

In 1979, the Iranian people again seized power away from the Shah. As rumors spread of another CIA coup to restore Shah Reza Pahlavi to power, Iranian students – fearing another American overthrow – quite rationally seized the U.S. embassy in an attempt to preserve the nascent Islamic Revolution. Later they used the hostages as a bargaining chip to lift financial sanctions – all rational actions. These facts are largely ignored in the Western media and the U.S. Hostage Crisis – an enormously undesirable outcome ultimately for both actors – remains a sore point to this day.

The rational choice comparativist could make a valid argument that far from rogue the DPRK and Iran have always acted as any other power would under the same circumstances – in their own interests. All sides tried to maximize their gains within the constraints of their ex ante beliefs about their choices, the choices of their political opponent and the framework of their dilemma. In this sense the rationalist could argue that all rogue states merely engage in behavior meant to strategically achieve policy goals conditional on uncertainty and misperception. So in a rational choice model of cross-national comparative analysis the key myth to dispel is that rogue states are irrational. To the rationalist, if rogue states are simply irrational states, then rogue states are not a separate type of state but are, as Saunders suggest, simply “the enemies of great powers.”
Taking this logic into account, we have addressed rationality in our definition by not addressing it. Despite having dispelled the superstition of requisite irrationality, whether or not rationality or irrationality is a qualifier for rogue state membership is an argument that is largely irrelevant within the context of our analysis. Though the label of irrationality for rogues is often employed in political science literature, a more exhaustive approach will reveal that irrationality is rarely, if ever, clearly manifest. Even so, a state may be sharply antagonistic to international society’s interests and be either rational or irrational. In this sense the Saund er’s question is rhetorical.

5.2. CULTURE

Cultural studies in comparative analysis are enormously important to understanding rogue states as they relate to the norms and interests of international society. Culture is the broad framework in which societies interpret their socio-political environments. Comparativist Marc Howard Ross adopts an often-used simplification of culture: that it is a “pattern of meaning.” He, like Saunders, emphasizes the idea of “shared meaning” adding understandings “among people who have a common… identity that distinguishes them from outsiders.”\textsuperscript{20} The cultural paradigm examines the macro-cleavages of these identity groups within, without and across states of the international system.

Ross suggests that there is a hierarchy of preferences within any cultural entity. He states that “culture orders political priorities.”\textsuperscript{21} If rogue states oppose the regimes and values, or the priorities thereof in international society, then a dominant explanation could be that a rogue state has different hierarchies of norms and values and different “patterns of meaning” – a cultural

\textsuperscript{20} Marc Howard Ross. “Culture in Comparative Analysis” In \textit{Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure}. Edited by Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 137.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 139-140.
difference that shapes its dealings with other nations. Constructivist scholar Martha Finnemore argues:

The fact that we live in an international society means that what we want and in some ways, who we are, are shaped by the social norms, rules, understandings, and relationships we have with others. These social realities are as influential as material realities in determining behavior. Indeed, they are what endow material realities with meaning and purpose. In political terms, it is these social realities that provide us with ends to which power and wealth can be used.  

In other words, rationality and behavior at the individual or state level are driven as much by social and cultural distinctions – as Ross states, differences in understandings or worldviews – as much as it is for any material benefit; and what is materially valued or deemed spiritually beneficial is inexorably linked to group identity.

For example, austere interpretations of Islam in Iran produce some leaders who perceive Western capitalism and secular democracy to be unjust, decadent, materialistic, and spiritually corrupting from their unique culturalist perspective. Whereas the Western point of view largely accepts that the capitalist merit system is moral, limits free-ridership and leads individuals to personal responsibility and material wealth which allows access to higher education and resources to accomplish personal and societal goals that are productive. In Iran the state has a moral duty to protect the spiritual welfare of its citizens. In the United States the idea of the state advocating and enforcing any moral position on spirituality is abhorrent and horrifying as it conflicts with individual freedoms and personal choices. Each believes it has the moral high ground because it has been cultivated within their group identity and nourished with nationalism. It follows then that this could be a convincing explanation for the conflict between rogues and

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the West. While these examples are reductionist oversimplifications, they illustrate the resultant cultural tension that perpetuates the idea that from each states culturalist perspective the “other states” are outside the norm. But are these differences enough to not only be outside the norm of international society, but to also sharply conflict with its interests?

According to Samuel Huntington these cultural differences form national interests that have ultimately resulted in his famous “clash of civilizations”.23 One could point to the fact that the modern rogue states – Iran, North Korea, Saddam’s Iraq and Gadhafi’s Libya – all lay outside Western civilization, and thus international society. This notion presumes a requisite of macro-cultural cleavage that will contribute to rogue state behavior. However, Huntington neglects to address the fact that most of the world is not part of Western civilization and yet out of 195 countries, only a handful are rogue states. He also fails to point out that there is significant variation and discord within the same cultural civilizations as well as without.

Another problem facing the cultural paradigm as an explanation for rogue behavior is that the multitude of cultural platforms – religion, global social class, nationalism, language, common history, etc. – all exacerbate the difficulty of pinning down exactly how and by what social mechanism conflict manifests itself if the culturalist paradigm has explanatory value in explaining outliers in the international system. Is it any one particular unit; a combination of key units? Virtually everything in a society is a construct of culture in some way. The cultural paradigm is therefore, an imprecise and nebulous approach to separate collective identity from other social constructs such as the national interest or established international norms.

These problems with cultural analysis however, do not abolish it from contributing to a meaningful description of rogue states and their behavioral variation from international society.

It is intuitively obvious that culture plays a significant role in explaining conflicts of norms and interests due to divergent hierarchical preferences and incompatible cultural world views. Therefore, though it should not be ruled out as a strong contributory component, Huntington’s macro-cleavage argument is overstated and much of the cultural analysis confronts problematic obstacles in identifying and measuring persistent and dynamic trans-generational intra-societal variables. Moreover, other contributory factors, as outlined in other sections, far more conspicuous than religious or cultural differences have led to rogue state conflict with the West.

5.3. STRUCTURALISM

The structuralist-comparativist approach, often referred to as “institutionalism,” makes the case that the existence of large interstate and intrastate institutions shapes the aggregate policy preferences of nations. As Etel Solingen writes of the structural approach:

…recent literature in the past decade examines the impact of international structure (international power distribution, global markets, international institutions and norms, and their agents), on domestic structures (states, political parties, party systems, policy networks, civil society, social movements, shared norms) as well as on processes.24

Structuralism is in a way the inverse of rationalism; though institutionalist literature is abundant with rationalist analysis to explain macro-behavior, it emphasizes analysis of the collective whole, rather than rationalism’s methodological individualism. The international system is a construct of nation-states and structuralism is a paradigm that observes how the differences of intrastate institutions affect behavior and interactions in the larger macro-

international system. Intrastate systems – Sonlingen’s domestic structures – affect behavior within the state, and thus its behavior toward the larger interstate system because of the constraints and allowances that permit the license of behavior within specific state cases. For example, while Western-style democracy fits well in most of the developed world, in many of the splintered and tribalized societies of underdeveloped countries Western-style democracy has had motley success. The governments of Iraq and Afghanistan – both recent “indoctrinates” to democracy – struggle with assimilating democratic ideas into long established corrupt, patriarchal and neo-feudal institutions.

Ira Katznelson argues that examining the differences in intrastate and interstate macro-structures demonstrates observable patterns among what he calls the “big structures of modernity – including capitalism, civil society and nation states.” It follows then that a macro analysis of rogue state institutions will yield productive explanatory data. Here we examine several formal and informal structural variables and analyze them within our definitional context: government type, religious ideology, civil society, electoral process and pluralism ranking and military strength. This is a cursory review of some key structural variables to illustrate common elements within the rogues. A comprehensive structural analysis exceeding these elementary variables is beyond the scope of this paper.

5.3.1. GOVERNMENT TYPE
The first and perhaps most obvious macro-structural component common among Iran, North Korea, Iraq under Saddam and Libya are that all are authoritarian regimes. The latter three are headed by “strongmen” (more totalitarian than authoritarian), while Iran is a fascist theocracy

with elements of meaningful constitutional democracy fortified by multiple core individuals with
disproportional formal and informal power. Likewise, Afghanistan under the Taliban –
considered a rogue post 9/11, was also a fascist one-party authoritarian theocracy.

A macro-structural correlation therefore exists between authoritarian systems and rogue
states. It seems however, that while it may be a requisite for membership in the rogue states,
authoritarianism is hardly specific to rogues as many authoritarian regimes, such as Jordan and
Saudi Arabia, are not considered rogues, but allies of the West. In fact, while only a handful of
states are rogue states, more than 30 percent of all nations fall within the authoritarian
classification and only 18 percent are regarded as “full democracies.”26 Less than one percent of
that 30 percent are rogue members as shown in Table 1; (4 out of 51 authoritarian regimes are
rogues). In other words, most rogue states appear to be authoritarian while not all authoritarian
states are rogues.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy Index by Regime Type</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>% of Countries</th>
<th>% of World Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Full democracies</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flawed democracies</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid regimes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian regimes</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogue States</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. State Department, Economist Intelligence Unit; CIA World Factbook

Note: The year for most of the above data is 2008 and includes 167 countries. The above table displays four rogue states (Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria) singled out, yet still part of the authoritarian category and thus no calculation is made for % of World Population and the % of countries therefore are not 100%. These four rogue states are based on the U.S. State Dept. list of state sponsors of terrorism as of 2010, while many of our case study analysis emphasizes Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya due to their recent historical significance. Obviously, Libya and Iraq are not currently rogues and numerically, our “handful” of rogues under any year analysis will show similar percentages.27

27 U.S. State Department, Economist Intelligence Unit; CIA World Factbook.
While Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya have also had their regimes established through revolution or coup, a weak correlation exists between this variable and rogue states because authoritarian regimes rarely are established via mechanisms other than revolutions or coups such as electoral devices. (The most famous exception of course is the rise of the Nazi party and Adolf Hitler after the Weimar Republic’s election of 1932). Revolutions or coups may be therefore a sub-component of the authoritarian variable.

5.3.2. RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY

There is a small, well-intentioned but boisterous group of politically neo-conservative U.S. policymakers and pundits who insist that a main component for rogue behavior is religious ideology. They point to the fact that the four main rogue states are non-Christian states. The implication of this worldview is that rogue state behavior is due to the fact that non-Christian – namely Islamic – philosophy is inherently violent and “non-Western” in its values. They have adopted and hijacked Huntington’s already overstated argument. Many U.S. policymakers are vocal opponents of “radical Islam” and some best-selling authors such as Robert Spencer even consider the term “radical Islam” to be a redundancy.28

They argue that Islam is a more convincing explanation for rogue state behavior than other variables such as real or imagined grievances vis-à-vis Western oppression; colonialism and domination; poverty; desire for self-determination; political disenfranchisement; or (perhaps ironically) resistance to authoritarianism. A more than cursory examination however, reveals that this variable is a matter more of regional analysis than of religious dogma and ignores the fact that largely Christian states, such as South Africa and Cuba, have also been ostracized by

international society for rogue behavior. It is not for political correctness that we consider this variable to be peripheral at best, but rather because the evidence simply does not support the claim that religious ideology is a significant factor in defining rogue behavior. Did anyone really take seriously Saddam Hussein’s call to jihad when his regime was almost finished? Notwithstanding the opportunism of factions and leaders within these states to demonstrate religion’s effectiveness as a rhetorical device, at least regarding the modern rogue states, it appears to be a correlation without causation.

5.3.3. CIVIL SOCIETY

Also related to the authoritarian system is the fact that all of these states have also had relatively weak civil societies during their rogue status and during most of their time off the rogue list. Our civil society definition will be limited in scope to political pressure groups and interest groups as their relevance in affecting change on the existing governments and thus rogue behavior is paramount.

North Korea has no political pressure groups or interest groups. In many ways Kim Jong Il’s regime is more Stalinist than Stalin. Iraq under Saddam had interest groups that were regime puppets aside from exiled opposition groups allied with the U.S. and based outside of Iraq. Up until recently Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi controlled the Arab Nationalists in his country and the Libyan exile movement had virtually no power. Iran, while still authoritarian is the only rogue state with real political opposition and mass demonstrations. Volunteerism in political opposition groups comes at a high price however, where even former Vice Presidents are jailed
and protestors are killed, tortured or imprisoned. Civil Society remains weak in all rogue states and thus a correlation between weak civil society and rogues appears credible.\textsuperscript{29}

### 5.3.4. ELECTORAL PROCESS AND PLURALISM

A related variable to volunteerism/civil society of political institutionalism is the effectiveness of the electoral process and political pluralism. The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks this variable for the current State Department rogues as nearly nil. North Korea and Syria rate 0.00 on a scale of 0 to 10 while Iran and Sudan rate 0.92 and 1.33 respectively. Table 2 shows the rank of current rogues compared to the top nine countries with the most effective and robust electoral process and pluralism ranking, along with the UK, France and the United States for comparative examination. This table clearly illustrates a difference between the West and the rogue states congruent with the authoritarian variable. There is clearly a correlation between weak electoral processes and political pluralism and rogue membership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Denmark</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland, New Zealand, Luxembourg</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia, Uruguay</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom, France</td>
<td>9.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea, Syria</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{29} CIA World Factbook\textsuperscript{”,} https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html
However, Table 3 (below) illustrates that similar to the democracy index, while low electoral process and pluralism appears to be a requisite for rogue membership, not all countries that rank low in these variables are rogues. Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are not rogue states yet rank close to the rogues on the index. Furthermore, China is ranked zero (not on the table below) – lower than Iran, on the electoral process/pluralism index.  

![Table 3]

**Electoral Process and Pluralism Ranking**

*Middle East Western Allies vs. The Rogue States*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia, UAE</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea, Syria</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Economist Intelligence Unit*

This is further corroborating evidence that rogue states are defined by interests not norms and that the major powers are never considered rogues. China, low on the index in electoral process and pluralism ranking, does indeed work against American interests but is not a rogue because it is too large of a power for rogue membership and posesses sufficient clout to

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
contribute to the interests of international society. Jordan and Egypt – medium powers – are aligned with U.S. interests, are rewarded with foreign aid and thus, are also not rogue states. It is interesting to note, however that the U.S. ally Pakistan (also not in the above tables) ranks 6.08 despite its past rogue behavior, though again not labeled a rogue state because it is largely aligned with U.S. interests.

5.3.5. MILITARY STRENGTH

There are many variables to measure military strength; numbers of aircraft and tanks, numbers of personnel etc. Many of these numbers are misleading. For example, during the Yom Kippur War the Arab air forces outnumbered the Israelis’ by more than two to one. However, because the Israelis were much better at maintenance and turnaround they were able to fly four times the number of sorties, which overcame the numerical disadvantage. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is the largest standing army on earth at roughly 2.2 million troops, yet they have purposefully chosen to not build amphibious landing craft as a signal to the U.S. that Taiwan would not be threatened with invasion and their projection of power will remain regional – for now.33

Knowing troop levels without knowing the naval capability can be misleading. Because of these and other sorts of measurement problems, which lead inevitably into classical debates over military strategy (i.e. Are greater numbers “stronger” than greater firepower?), military expenditures in constant U.S. dollars are an optimal, albeit imperfect, variable to measure military strength.

As Table 4 shows, all the rogue states appear to be at least medium or regional military powers; they all spend under $15 billion in military expenditures. The height of rogue military spending is Iran at $12.23 billion in 2006. Libya did not break the $1 billion threshold until long after it came off the rogue state list in 2003. None of the spending approaches the major powers and the United States dwarfs all other nations at around $660 billion in 2009. No rogue power has spent less than $425 million on its military budget in the past decade. While no expenditure numbers are available for North Korea, that nation has one of the world’s largest standing armies at roughly 1.2 million troops, and is perhaps the most credible of all rogue threats to U.S. interests and allies, namely South Korea.34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>377,228</td>
<td>380,271</td>
<td>426,982</td>
<td>485,975</td>
<td>529,673</td>
<td>554,930</td>
<td>563,549</td>
<td>578,340</td>
<td>616,073</td>
<td>663,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>[29,700]</td>
<td>[33,000]</td>
<td>[36,600]</td>
<td>[39,000]</td>
<td>[40,600]</td>
<td>[44,200]</td>
<td>[48,400]</td>
<td>[52,500]</td>
<td>[58,300]</td>
<td>[61,000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>[31,200]</td>
<td>[38,400]</td>
<td>[44,400]</td>
<td>[48,500]</td>
<td>[53,100]</td>
<td>[59,000]</td>
<td>[68,800]</td>
<td>[77,900]</td>
<td>[86,200]</td>
<td>[98,800]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>21,874</td>
<td>22,636</td>
<td>22,566</td>
<td>23,070</td>
<td>26,773</td>
<td>28,295</td>
<td>28,465</td>
<td>28,866</td>
<td>32,334</td>
<td>36,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>7,409</td>
<td>8,175</td>
<td>6,148</td>
<td>7,195</td>
<td>9,109</td>
<td>11,296</td>
<td>12,233</td>
<td>10,158</td>
<td>9,174</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>[2,584]</td>
<td>[2,583]</td>
<td>[7,097]</td>
<td>[5,324]</td>
<td>[3,814]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>1,985</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>1,883</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Note: Figures are in US $m. at constant 2008 prices and exchange rates for 2000–2009. Parenthetical statistics are estimates.

These numbers further corroborate our evidentiary finding that capability and credibility are key components to rogue state behavior. A robust military infrastructure enables rogue states to establish a credible threat as opposed to merely a threat. Therefore, a correlation exists between rogue states and states that spend no less than $425 million and no more than $15 billion in military expenditures. That is to say, a rogue state must be a medium or regional power.

5.3.6. OTHER VARIABLES

Further examination of other variables regarding rogue states is needed. For example, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan were all U.S. client states during the Cold War. Rogue states tend to have more centrally planned economic systems than the West and many rogues are also former Soviet client states, economically orphaned by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The economic systems of rogues tend more toward socialism such as Libya’s Islamic socialism and free market capitalism is usually restrained or, as in the North Korean case, non-existent. Resource wealth seems to be a variable worth exploring and the effect of sanctions policy on rogue states could yield an abundance of profitable behavioral information. Such issues and many others are beyond the cursory, definitional and analytical scope of this paper, however they are worth mentioning for further study.

6. ROGUE STATE BEHAVIOR AND NET INTERESTS

A comparative explication of rogue state behavior as it relates to antagonism against international society’s interests is in order. While we have addressed rogue behavior within the
definitional context and comparative traditions above, we now turn to a behavioral question expressed in our definition as “net interests” to further illustrate what rogue behavior means. We revisit Noam Chomsky’s hypocrisy criticism and ask: “Why is Iran a rogue state and Pakistan not a rogue state when both have clearly worked against American interests for decades?” Are not interests the key component of defining rogues that this paper asserts? If Pakistan works against American interests, why then do we not define it as a rogue? These questions are related to our “perspectives” and hypocrisy arguments above. Part of the answer lies in the erroneous realist assumption of the unitary state. Does Pakistan engage in rogue behavior or do extremist institutional elements within Pakistan engage in rogue behavior? The other part of the answer, which we emphasize here, lies within the rationalist tradition: choosing policy through expected utility, which assumes a calculation. In other words, interests are determined by the overall net utility gain, even if there are conditions within the calculation where a potential rogue or elements therein works against some interests. The Pakistan case illustrates this insight.

The Pakistani leadership under Zia Al-Haq aggressively established a nuclear weapons program following the loss of East Pakistan in the early 1970s. This conduct convinced U.S. President Jimmy Carter to suspend most economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan in 1977. Then in December of 1979 80,000 Soviet troops surged across their border into Afghanistan.

Like most issues prior to 1991 the United States perceived every crisis and problem in the international system through the lens of the Cold War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was no different. Suddenly Pakistan was a needed ally to fight a proxy war against the Soviets. Aid was restored and increased to Pakistan almost immediately following the invasion and by

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1981 the Reagan administration’s policy toward Pakistan’s rogue behavior was to “hear, speak and see no evil.” As Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins wrote in their groundbreaking “The Man From Pakistan” – a narrative of the ‘Islamic Bomb’ and the A.Q. Khan network:

Washington could live with Pakistan’s pursuit of an atomic bomb as long as it got the help it needed against the Soviets. Reagan’s first secretary of state, General Alexander Haig, told Pakistani officials that their nuclear program ‘need not become the centerpiece of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.’

A rational choice was made by American policymakers to pursue their overall interests at the expense of established norms – namely nuclear proliferation. Pakistan would not be a rogue despite the fact that Libya, Iran and North Korea – all U.S. enemies – were receiving nuclear weapons technology from the blossoming Pakistani program – something U.S. intelligence was well aware of. Clearly, U.S. policymakers rationally calculated that the expected utility of handing the Soviets a defeat far outweighed the potential problems caused by Pakistani nuclear proliferation. An analysis of the prudence of this policy lies outside the scope of this paper. What is important to understand is that the U.S. desire to force a Russian retreat was more important than the principle of non-proliferation. Net interests outweighed norms in deciding the status of Pakistan as a rogue state. This exemplifies why our definition explicates that rogues defy the “net interests” and not merely “interests” of international society as defined by major powers.

One last factor important to the classification of rogues lies in the idea of belligerence. Pakistan has never made threatening statements publicly vis-à-vis the United States while the four main rogues discussed in this paper consistently have antagonized the west with hyperbolic rhetoric during their time as rogue members. While still a rogue, Libyan leader Moammar

\[37\text{Ibid., 108.}\]
Gadhafi proclaimed “God damn America.”\textsuperscript{38} North Korea’s Kim Jong Il is prone to statements such as, “our revolutionary armed forces will launch without hesitation... against the strongholds of the U.S. and Japanese aggressors and the South Korean puppets.”\textsuperscript{39} Within hours after the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, Saddam Hussein stated, “The United States reaps the thorns its rulers have planted in the world... the real perpetrators of [the attacks] are within the collapsed buildings... [it] was God’s punishment.”\textsuperscript{40} And lastly, the Iranian regime has provided a smorgasbord of pugnacious bellicosity; perhaps the most famous are “Death to America” and “Israel must be wiped off the map.”

It seems that a requisite of rogue state membership therefore, is the maintenance of belligerent rhetoric toward international society and its interests.

7. THE THREE COMPARATIVE TRADITIONS IN CONTEXT

It would be a mistake to conclude that the three comparative traditions are mutually exclusive in our analysis. For example, religious systems are both institutional entities and cultural. Cultural preferences may be aggregated individuals’ preferences based on rational choices, such as adopting religion because of family tradition or because one religion over another may offer more material benefits such as in theocratic regimes (i.e. Taliban and Iran). Rational choice also plays an enormous role in identifying the interests of international society and structures such as international norms (i.e. U.N. Statement of Human Rights, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)

\textsuperscript{38}Time Magazine, “The Arab World: Oil, Power, Violence”, \textit{Time Magazine}, April 2, 1973, 6 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907040-1,00.html
\textsuperscript{40} Air War College “Saddam Hussein: In His Own Words” \textit{United States Air Force}, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awegate/iraq/sadquotes.htm
and institutions (i.e. United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization) are established to pursue those interests.

If as Ross suggests, culture orders preferences then using this cultural hierarchy can provide context for rational choices based on those preferences while institutions are established to reinforce and consolidate those same preferences. Institutions are established through rational choice whose expected utilities are defined by cultural values and preferences. All three paradigms are different ways of examine the same whole. They are the blind men examining the elephant, all providing explanatory value. That is to say, all three comparative traditions are inseparably germane to the analysis of rogue states.

8. CONCLUSION

This paper, while a cursory comparative examination of rogue states is a first step in providing rigorous analysis and classification of rogues as a separate species of states that deserves distinct recognition. Rogues are indeed the enemies of great powers, but they are much more than that. Here we have provided a definitional criterion for precise analysis and have corrected typological problems within the current scarce and deficient literature. We have shown that norms are a muddled and confused definitional approach for analyzing rogue states. We have insisted that norms be replaced by the clarity of interests as the defining criteria.

Through comparative analysis of certain rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea and non-rogue states such as Pakistan, we have provided corroborating evidence for our careful definition through the scrutiny of the three comparative traditions: rationalism, culturalism and structuralism. First we employed the rationalist approach to demonstrate how norms are cast aside when interests are at stake such as in the Pakistan case study. Our excursion
into the rational choice paradigm has demonstrated that rogue states need not be irrational as much of the contemporary analysis suggests. Second, the culturalist approach provides a way of determining preferences and a hierarchy of interests through macro-cleavages between rogues and the West. Lastly, our structuralism and institutional analysis, along with selected structural variables, provide empirical and qualitative support for our sub-conclusions such as the observation that rogues must be medium powers, belligerent and authoritarian, and for our primary argument that interests, not norms are the cardinal criteria for understanding and analyzing rogue states’ membership and behavior.

To answer Saunder’s question, rogue states do exist and deserve separate classification as that handful of states that engage in behavior that sharply conflicts with the net interests of international society as defined largely by the United States and the West. They are states that possess sufficient power to credibly threaten other states, but lack the power to define the interests of international society. This paper corrects the existing, nascent literature’s mistake of defining the rogue in terms of norms. While norms are deficient criteria of contemporary analysis, the definition of rogue states based on interests explains the hypocrisy of international society and non-rogues within the system and the cross-national comparative analysis established in this paper.
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